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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
REID D. BENCH and ALTA M. 1
BENCH, has wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case No.
vs.
13929
ERMA PACE,
Defendant and Respondent. J

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE TYPE OF CASE
This is an action for specific performance of a written Lease Option Agreement wherein plaintiffs purchased
from defendant a 120 acre farm located in Duchesne
County, State of Utah. The defendant refused to convey
a fee title to the property daiming that under the terms
of an anal agreement entered into by the parties at the
time of the execution of the written document, it was
agreed the mineral rights to the property would be reserved to the defendant.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court admitted into evidence the alleged
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oral agreement and other extrinsic evidence, and other
parol evidence overruling plaintiffs' objection and motion
to strike, and based upon said evidence, reformed the
written document to include a reservation of the mineral
rights to defendant. Further, the court ruled that plaintiffs did not exercise the option in accordance with the
written agreement and entered Judgment restoring possession of the property to defendant and damages of
reasonable rental value.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the decision and Judgment
entered by the trial court in reforming the written Lease
Option Agreement and for a Judgment by this Court
granting plaintiffs specific performance of said written Lease Option Agreement and awarding to plaintiffs
fee simple title to the property.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 8, 1965, Reid D. Bench and Alia M.
Bench, his wife, as Buyers, entered into a Lease-Sales
Contract (Ex. 2) with Erma Pace and Aaron Pace as
Owners. The subject matter of the Lease-Sales Contract
was a certain irrigated farm located approximately 10
miles northwest of the City of Roosevelt, Utah. The
contract described the property more particularly as
follows:
" N E % N E *4; Section 28, T. 1 S., R.
2W., U.S.M. and also E % S E %; Section 21,
T. 1 S., R. 2W., U.S.M."
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The contract provided certain terms for a three year
lease from the date of the execution of the contract. It
also provided that the Buyers would have the option to
purchase the farm and put forth the terms and conditions
of that purchase. Included among those terms and conditions were the total price of the purchase, that the
down-payment should not be less than $2,000.00> that the
interest rate would be 5% annually on the unpaid balance, the minimum annual payment, that title insurance
should be furnished by the Sellers, that certain personalty was to go with the farm, that certain plants could be
dug up should the option not be exercised, and that
balloon payments could be made to reduce the principal
balance due more rapidly.
On May 22, 1967, Erma Pace and Reid Bench entered into a Lease-Extension Agreement extending the
time for the exercise of the option for five additional
years, making the date of expiration of the option September, 1973 (Ex. 16)
On January 8, 1971, Mr. Bench exercised his option
to purchase the land by tendering the $2,000.00 requirement along with back rental payments. (Exs. 15, 18)
The check for $2,000.00 as well as the other checks were
endorsed and deposited by Mrs. Pace. (R. 85)
Subsequent to that tender, a dispute arose between
the parties. That dispute is summarized in a letter signed
by John C. Beaslin, Erma Pace's lawyer, dated April
5, 1971, in which the following was communicated to Mr.
Bench:
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"This letter is to advise you that Mrs. Pace
has contacted this office with reference to an
apparent misunderstanding with reference to
your letter dated September 8, 1965, and your
subsequent extension of that lease agreement
by the parties.
Pursuant to the terms of the lease and
your paying the $2,000.00 please be advised
that this does not constitute a sale of the property, and it will be necessary and mandatory
if you want to proceed to exercise the option
provision of your lease that the same will have
to be converted to a sale of the 120 acres. Also,
pursuant to the escrow agreement which Mr.
Sam prepared, and which you have a copy of,
would have to be executed or you will merely
continue on with the lease until the same expires by its terms, which would be September
15, 1973.
If you want to exercise the option to purchase the property, then it will be necessary
that you either sign the escrow agreement and
place the same at the bank, together with a
deed from Mrs. Pace to be delivered upon the
payment of the contract amount in full, or,
it will be construed that you have not in fact
bought the property.
I t is going to necessitate your paying more
than $1,000.00 per year on the unpaid balance
of the contract, or, as you stated to Mrs. Pace,
you would never pay for the property. Would
you, therefore, please advise this office either
personally or through your attorney as to how
you want to complete the transaction with Mrs.
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Pace. I await your reply with reference to this
matter." (Ex. 7)
The escrow agreement referred to in Mr. Beaslin's
letter, (Ex. 6), had, prior to that time, been examined
by Mr. Bench, and he commented about it to Mr. Beaslin
in a letter dated April 12, 1971, wherein he said:
" I have not signed the papers prepared
by Mr. Sam because these terms are being
changed. The papers prepared by Mr. Sam
make no reference at all to the original Lease
Purchase Agreement completely ignoring the
facts there . . . I will take a day off this week
and contact Mrs. Pace and/or yourself to see
if this misunderstanding can be resolved."
(Ex. 8)
After negotiations for settlement between the parties
were unsuccessful, Mrs. Pace sent a letter dated June 2,
1971, indicating to Mr. Bench that his tender had been
refused. That letter notified him that he was now back
on the lease basis of the contract and told him that he
owed various amounts of money for rent accrued since
the time of the tender. (Ex. 17)
In reply to the letter of June 2, 1971, Mr. Bench
sent to Mrs Pace the sums of money she claimed he owed
for rental and other items. In the letter he sent accompanying those payments, he made this statement:
" I t is only our desire and intention to purchase the farm per our original lease purchase
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agreement and the terms there outlined." (Ex.
10)
Being unable to reach any sort of negotiated settlement, this action was commenced on the 30th day of
November, 1972, prior to the expiration date for the exercise of the option.
At trial counsel for the defendant introduced parol
evidence and other extrinsic evidence over the objection
of counsel for the plaintiffs as to the intention of the
parties at the time of the execuition of the original Lease
S&les Contract. Mrs. Pace claimed that at the time of
signing the Lease Sales Contract the parties had agreed
that the oil and mineral rights were to be reserved to
her and her son, Aaron. (R. 78) As the pleadings to
this action indicate, this evidence was to show that there
was either a fraud perpetrated by Mr. Bench at the expense of Mrs, Pace or that the parties were mutually
mistaken as to the content of that contract.
As to hear intent or understanding at the time of the
execution of the Lease-Sales Contract, Mrs. Pace testified as follows:
"Q. You were aware very early in the
proceedings of the failure to have the reservation of oil and gas rights in the document, were
you not?
A. I was aware that it should have been
in there before I ever signed it." (R-110)
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Counsel for plaintiffs objected to the introduction of
testimony of various witnesses as to any and all oral conversations and any other extrinsioe evidence in which
plaintiffs purportedly conceded the oil and gas rights
were to be reserved to defendant and her son, Aaron.
The grounds for this series of objections and the motion
to strike at the conclusion of the case were as follows:
(R. 154-159)
1. The contract on its face was complete and
unambiguous and the testimony was not offered for the purpose of, nor did it purport to
explain any ambiguity within the instrument.
2. No evidence was before the court, nor
was any evidence introduced upon which a
finding of mutual mistake of fact or fraud
could be made, and without such evidence no
sufficient foundation was laid which would
make such testimony admissible.
3. The Utah Statute of Frauds, Section
25-1-1 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, prevents the
introduction of extrinsic evidence to a clear and
unambiguous contract or conveyance of real
property.
4. The Utah Statute of Limitations for the
claiming of a fraud or mistake, Sections 7812-25 and 78-12-26(3) of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, and laches prevents
defendant from raising those defenses at this
late date.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LEASE SALES CONTRACT CONVEYED A FEE SIMPLE INTEREST IN THE
PROPERTY DESCRIBED, INCLUDING ALL
OIL, GAS AND MINERAL RIGHTS.
There can be no question that the Lease Sales Contract constituted a conveyance subjecting the parties to
all rights and liabilities pertaining to conveyances, and
the court below has not ruled differently.
Section 57-1-1, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, provides:
"The term 'conveyance' as used in this
title shall be construed to embrace every ininstrument in writing by which any real estate,
or interest in real estate is created, aliened,
mortgaged, encumbered or assigned, except
wills and leases for a term not exceeding one
year." (Emphasis added)
The Lease Sales Contract signed and executed by the
parties provides in part as follows:
"This agreement made and entered into
this 8th day of September, 1965 between Erma
Pace and Aaron Pace hereinafter referred to
as the owners and Reid D. Bench and Alta
M. Bench, hereinafter referred to as the Buyers, whereby the Owners have agreed to
L E A S E and subsequently S E L L to the buyers that certain one hundred twenty (120) acre
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irrigated farm located approximately ten miles
northwest of the city of Roosevelt, County of
Duchesne, state of U T A H , and more particularly described as follows:
N E % N E *4; Sec. 28, T. IS., R. 2W.,
U.S.M. and also E Vi SE ; Sec. 21, T. IS.,
R. 2 W U . S . M . " (Exhibit 2)
The foregoing language wherein the owners agreed
to lease and subsequently sell "that certain one hundred
twenty (120) acre irrigated fetrcn * * * more particularly desoriibed as follows:" with no reservation of
any rights, gives rise to a clear presumption that the
Seller has conveyed a fee simple estate in the property.
Section 57-1-3, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, reads as follows:
"A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass by a conveyance of real estate,
unless it appears from the conveyance that a
lesser estate was intended." (Emphasis added)
It is equally clear from the language of the statute
that the presumption that a fee simple title is intended
to pass cannot be rebutted "unless it appears from the
conveyance that a lesser estate was intended." See:
Russell v. Geyser-Marion Gold Mining Company, 18 U.
2d 363, 423 P. 2d 487 (1967).
In the case at bar the defendant has conceded not
only that the conveyance does not purport to convey
a lesser estate than a fee simple title, but that she was
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well aware of the fact before she ever signed the document. She testified:
"Q. You were aware very early in the proceedings of the failure to have the reservation
of oil and gas rights in the document, were you
not?
A. I was aware that it should have been
in there before I ever signed it." (R. 110; see
also R. 104-105)
The common law rule supports the Utah statutory
rule and is likewise to the effect that a general conveyance without an exception or reservation of the minerals
therein passes the mineral rights as well as the surface
rights and that a severance occurs only by clear and distinct wording in the conveyance.
In 54 Am. Jur. 2d, Mines and Minerals, Section 108,
the rule is set forth as follows:
"A general conveyance of land without
any exception or reservation of the minerals
therein carries with it the minerals as well as
the surface. A severance occurs only by clear
and distinct wording in the conveyance. Until
such a severance occurs, the ownership of the
surface carries with it the ownership of the underlying minerals."
And in 58 C. J. S., Mines and Minerals, Section 134, it
is said:
"However, in the absence of a separate
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grant or conveyance thereof, minerals in place
belong to the owner of the surface of the land
beneath which they lie, and pass with it by
deed, gift or other form of conveyance."
And, again, in Section 146:
"In accordance with such rules, a general
conveyance of land with minerals, without any
exception or reservation, passes to the purchaser or his heirs and assigns the whole interest of the vendor in the property described.
"A conveyance of land passes all minerals
therein, where it contains an express provision
to that effect and, even though it does not contain such a provision or specification, it is well
settled at common law that a general conveyance of land without an exception or reservation of the minerals therein, or language showing that the title to minerals is not intended
to pass, will carry the grantor's right to, and
interest in, all coal, oil, gas and other minerals
in the land." (Emphasis added)
See also: LeBard v. Richfield Oil, 364 P. 2d 449
(Cal. 1961); Voyta v. Clouts, 328 P. 2d 655 (Mont. 1958).
POINT II.
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN ALLOWING PAROL EVIDENCE ADMITTED AS
TO AN ORAL U N D E R S T A N D I N G OR
AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES TO RE-
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SERVE OIL, GAS AND MINERAL RIGHTS
TO RESPONDENT WHICH WAS NOT CONTAINED IN THE WRITTEN LEASE SALES
AGREEMENT.
A. Statement of the Law.
The law is clear and unequivocal that unless there
is evidence of fraud or mutual mistake of fact, oral evidence will not be allowed for the purpose of varjdng the
clear and unambiguous terms of a written instrument.
Judge Sorenson of the Fourth Judicial District rendered a decision in the case of E. A. Strout Western
Realty Agency, Inc. v. Owen H. Broderick,
U. 2d
, 522 P. 2d 144, (1974), which was reversed for an
improper interpretation of the parol evidence rule. The
appeal in that case was from a judgment against the
plaintiff and in favor of the defendant on a law action
to recover a real estate broker's commission based on an
exclusive listing agreement. The disputed language of
the contract was as follows:
"If a buyer or transferee ready, willing
and able to buy or exchange for this property
is procured by you or by anyone else, including
myself, I agree to pay you a commission of
6% of the selling price, or a minimum commission of $200.00, whichever is greater."
The defendant persuaded the trial court, by the use
of parol evidence, that the language above was not cor-
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rect and that he agreed to pay a commission only in case
the plaintiff sold the home.
This Court reversed the trial court with the following holding:
"Parole evidence may be received to clarify ambiguous language in a contract, to show
what the agreement was relative to filling in
blanks, and to supply omitted terms which were
agreed upon but inadvertently left out of the
written agreement. However, under the general rule, which is applicable here, parole evidence may not be given to change the terms
of a written agreement which are clear, definite, and unambiguous. To permit that would
be to cast doubt upon the integrity of all contracts and to leave a party to a solemn agreement at the mercy of uncertainties of oral
testimony given by one who in the subsequent
light of events discovers that he made a bad
bargain.
Written words can be examined so as to
ascertain what they stand for in connection
with particular conduct or particular objects.
Thus expressions of the parties prior to and
contemporaneous with the execution of a written instrument may be helpful in understanding the meaning of the language used. However, the defendant here does not seek to explain the meaning of a paragraph. He simply
wants the court to eliminate it in its entirety.
This the courts cannot do." (Emphasis added)
The case of Rainford v. Rytting, 22 Utah 2d 252, 451
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P. 2d 769 (1969), involved a suit between stockholders,
and the defendants asserted they were not personally
liable and wanted to introduce evidence to support that
claim. In affinning the trial court's ruling of Summary
Judgment, the court stated:
"We must agree with respondent that appellants are trying to vary the terms of the
written agreement by parol evidence, i.e., to
establish a different contract on facts known at
the time of reducing their understanding to a
written form.
* * * The rule is well settled that, where
the parties have reduced to writing what appears to be a complete and certain agreement,
it will, in the absence of fraud, be conclusively
presumed that the writing contained the whole
of the agreement between the parties, that it
is a complete memorial of such agreement, and
that parol evidence of contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements will
not be received for the purpose of varying or
adding to the terms of the written document.
The action of the trial court in the instant
case must be sustained, since appellants' affidavit consisted entirely of inadmissible parol
evidence, submitted for the purpose of varying
and adding to the terms of the written agreement of the parties."
In Jensen v. Rice, 7 U. 2d 276, 322 P. 2d 259 (1958),
plaintiff brought an action to recover the unpaid balance
of the purchase price of an automobile after sale at pub-
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lie auction following default in payment. Although the
defendant urged that he meant to enter into a different
contract and that he did not contract as alleged, the
Supreme Court affirmed the enforcement of the contract
as written. This case is striking in its parallels to the
case currently before the court. The court stated:
"As to the contentions that defendant did
not contract as alleged or that he executed a
different contract, both are refuted by, and are
inconsistent with defendant's signature on the
contract and his admitted knowledge of its
terms. Punctuated by objection, his testimony
was diametrically opposed to the manifestation of mutual assent reflected in his execution
of an instrument whose terms were clear, unambiguous, understandable and known.
Elementary it is that in construing contracts we seek to determine the intentions of
the parties. But it is also elementary and of
extreme practical importance that we hold contracting parties to their clear and understandable language deliberately committed to writing and endorsed by them as signatories thereto. Were this not so business, one with another
among our citizens, would be relegated to the
chaotic, and the rules of conduct for the maintenance and improvement of an orderly society's welfare and progress would find itself
impotent. I t is not unreasonable to hold one
responsible for language which he himself
espouses. Such language is the only implement
he gives us to fashion a determination as to the
intentions of the parties. Under such circum-
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stances we should not be required to embosom
any request that we ignore that very language.
This is as it should be. The rule excluding matters outside the four corners of a clear, understandable document, is a fair one, and one's
contentions concerning his intent should extend no further than his own clear expressions.
I t was urged correctly that to admit matters outside a contract would do violence to the
principle that one is bound by his manifestations of assent, and that, irrespective of such
contention, such matters properly are excludable by the parol evidence rule, —which rule,
counsel suggests, is one of substantive law rather than one of evidence. Whatever kind one
calls it, the rule that excludes such evidence is
a common sense rule." (Emphasis added)
The case of Robert D. Davison, et al. v. Arnold B.
Robbins, et aL, 30 U. 2d 338, 517 P. 2d 1026, (1973), was
an action by plaintiff for specific performance to purchase
real property. The agreement in question provided that
the offer was "conitingent upon buyer's approval of net
acreage description." The trial court permitted the buyers to introduce parol evidence to describe the net acreage and granted specific performance. In reversing the
trial court's ruling, the Supreme Court held that the
agreement constituted a mere expression to make a contract in the future and reversed the decision.
In discussing parol evidence, the court stated as follows:
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"Parol evidence is admissible to apply, not
to supply, a description of lands in a contract.
Parol evidence will not be admitted to complete a defective description, or to show the
intention with which it was made. Parol evidence may be used for the purpose of identifying the description contained in the writing
with its location upon the ground, but not for
the purpose of ascertaining and locating the
land about which the parties negotiated, and
supplying a description thereof which they
have omitted from the writing. There is a clear
distinction between the admission of oral and
extrinsic evidence for the purpose of identifying the land described and applying the description to the property and that of supplying and adding to a description insufficient and
void on its fact'/ (Emphasis added)
In the case of William R. Clyde v. Eddington Canning Company and W. R. Eddington, 10 U. 2d 14, 347
P. 2d 563, (1959) „, the defendant attempted to explain
that he was not to be personally liable for the agreement.
In affirming the Summary Judgment, the court stated:
"Defendant contends that by signing the
letter in the form indicated it was not his intention to be bound personally. H e so averred
in an affidavit upon which the matter was determined. Under the clear language of the writing we are not impressed with such contention, particularly since intentions cannot vary
the terms of clear, concise, unambiguous Ian-
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guage employed by him who says he did not
intend what he said." (Emphasis added)
Lenman v. Jones, 222 U. S. 51, 32 S. Ct. 18; involved
specific performance of a land contract. The seller refused to perform the agreement alleging that the buyers
failed to disclose the real parties who were involved in
the transaction. The trial court granted Summary Judgment, and Justice Holmes in affirming, stated as follows:
" I t is apparent from her own testimony
that she knew that Mrs. Wilhoite was only a
figurehead, and the most that can be contended is that she thought that another person, not
the appellee, most probably was the real man.
I t does not matter that she did. She suffered
no loss, and, moreover, Mr. Jones and his company were under no obligation to disclose their
interest, in the absence of fraud, which there
is not the slightest ground to suggest. It also is
urged that the defendant, when she signed the
instrument, thought that it merely gave an option. This is an immaterial afterthought. If she
did not know what she was doing, she had only
herself to thank, but no even one-sided mistake
is proved." (Emphasis added)
See also: Hatch v. Adams, 7 U. 2d 73, 318 P. 2d 633;
Rehearing Opinion, 8 U. 2d 82, 329 P. 2d 285 (1958).
B. The Lease Sales Contract is clear and unambiguous on its face and the trial court has in effect
so ruled.
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The Lease Sales Contract as executed by the parties
on the 8th day of September, 1965, described by legal
description the one hundred twenty acre irrigated farm
which was the subject of the contract, the consideration
to be paid in the event the option was exercised, and
the due dates and manner of payment. It required the
Seller to furnish title insurance, listed the personal property that went with the land, and concluded by giving
the Buyer the option of making accelerated payments to
reduce the principal balance due. There is no claim of
ambiguity as to any of these terms, and no effort was
made by defendant to explain them. (Exhibit 2)
The only contention made by defendant is that the
contract did not contain a claimed unwritten oral understanding to reserve the oil and gas rights. Said contention does not amount to an ambiguity. It amounts only
to an omission, and it most certainly does not amount
to the inadvertent omission to include terms that were
previously agreed upon but not included in a written
contract as contemplated in E. A. Strout Western Realty
Agency, Inc. v. Broderick, supra. Mrs, Pace acknowledged on cross examination that the Lease Sales Agreement which was signed by her and her son, Aaron, was
circulated among all those present at the time of execution; that she and her son read it from beginning to end;
that there was no effort whatsoever to make any changes;
and, most importantly, in three different places in the
cross-examination she affirmatively stated that she knew
at the time the contract was signed that it contained no
reservation and did not purport to contain any reserva-
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tion of oil, gas and mineral rights. (R. 103-104, 110)
Therefore, such an omission comes within the language of
Section 57-1-3 of the Utah Code and provisions of the
Parol Evidence Rule.
The court below has in effect ruled by adding to
the Contract a reservation of oil, gas and mineral rights
and not interpreting the meaning of the contract that
the Lease Sales Contract, (Exhibit 2), is clear and unambiguous on its face. (See Conclusion of Law, paragraphs 1 and 3; Findings of Fact, paragraphs 1 and 4.)
The above contention is further placed beyond doubt
by an examination of the prayer for relief in defendant's
Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim dated November 1, 1973. Paragraph B shows that defendant
framed the issue clearly for the court. There, defendant's
primary claim was for an interpretation of the Contract
in question and only in the alternative was there a prayer
for a reformation to conform to the alleged oral understanding of the parties. The pertinent language is as
follows:
"For declaratory relief interpreting the
Agreement to exclude gas, oil and mineral
rights or, in the alternative, for reformation
of the Agreement to conform to the understanding of the parties, thereby excluding gas,
oil and mineral rights."
The court below granted the alternative disregarding the
primary prayer.
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POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF
ANY ORAL AGREEMENT OR AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES, ANY
ORAL DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHERS, AND
ANY OTHER EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE PRIOR TO, CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH, OR
SUBSEQUENT TO THE EXECUTION OF
THE LEASE SALES CONTRACT OVER THE
OBJECTION THAT SUCH EVIDENCE IS
CONTRARY TO THE CLEAR AND PRECISE
TERMS OF THE UTAH STATUTE OF
FRAUDS.
At best, the claimed oral agreement between plaintiffs and defendant that at some future date Appellants
would perform the necessary acts to effectuaite a transfer
of title to the oil, gas and mineral rights back to Defendant, would be unenforceable as a violation of the Statute of Frauds.
The Utah Statute of Frauds, Section 25-5-1, U. C. A.
1953, states:
"Estate or interest in real property. No
estate or interest in real property . . . shall be
created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of
law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assign-
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ing, surrendering or declaring the same, or by
his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing." (Emphasis added)
The application of the Statute of Frauds to the case
at hand is beet summarized in 37 Am. Jur. 2d 110, Fraud
and Deceit, in which the authors cite Papanickolas v.
Sampson, 73 Utah 404, 274 P. 856 (1929), to stand for
the proposition that:
"* * * A number of cases state or indicate that the mere refusal to perform (an) oral
promise is not of itself a fraud for which an
action will lie, since in such a case the promisor
has not, in a legal sense, made a contract, and
hence has the right, both in law and in equity,
to refuse to perform. It has been said that to
allow an action on an unkept promise in some
instances is to enforce an oral promise, contrary
to the policy of the legislature as declared in the
Statute of Frauds. It has also been stated that
an action brought upon such a promise will be
considered one brought on an unenforceable
contract, rather than a maintainable one in tort
or deceit where the damages claimed showed
that in its essence the action was attempted to
be premised upon a breach of the promise falling within the statute (of Frauds)."
Also, the operation of the Statute of Frauds is not
confined to cases where an action is brought directly on
the contract, and whatever the form of the acts may be,
if proof of a promise or contract within the statute is
essential to maintain it, there can be no recovery unless
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the statute is satisfied. Easton v. Wycoff, 4 U. 2d 386,
295 P. 2d 386 (1956).
Of course, the parol evidence argument made previously applies to all written contracts. However, in the
case of a contract dealing with the conveyance of an
interest in real property, the Statute of Frauds is designed to add an additional stricture on the ability of
one contesting the terms of the contract to introduce extrinsic evidence to vary the terms contained therein. It
is not enough to say "I thought it was understood" (R.
104) when there is no dodbt that the person attempting
to vary the terms of the contract had read the entire
contract,, knew that the contract did not purport to reserve any oil, gas and mineral rights to her, made no
attempt in writing to change the terms of that contract,
and signed that contract without complaint. (R. 110)
It is also interesting to note that Aaron Pace, who was
a co-signer of the Lease Sales Agreement and a tenant in
common with the defendant, gave no testimony at trial
whatsoever cx>ncerning any mistake that either he or his
mother made at the time of the signing of the document.
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted to this Court
that the Statute of Frauds, in and of itself, bars any
admission of the extrinsice evidence that has heretofore
been mentioned.
POINT IV.
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO SUSTAIN
HER BURDEN OF PROVING FRAUD ON
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THE PART OF PLAINTIFFS BY CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, AND THE
COURT BELOW HAS IN ESSENCE SO
RULED.
In defendant's Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim dated November 1, 1973, under Third Defense,
paragraph 4, is the following contention:
"If the said Contract fails to reflect the
agreement of the parties, such failure is due
either to mutual mistake, to mistake in drafting, or to fraud on the part of Plaintiffs arising from their intentional attempt to deprive
Defendant of her property rights without just
compensation and through deception in the
preparation of the said Lease Option Agreement."
Throughout the proceedings in this action, the claim
of fraud has been the primary contention of defendant
in her defense. This is borne out in the closing statements of counsel at the trial wherein Mr. Boyden stated
the following:
"Mr. Boyden * * * Now then whether this
develops into fraud raises another question.
If this man is telling this woman that he
doesn't want the minerals he just wants to get
his family away from the city, and then he goes
down and tells a lawyer I want to protect
whatever right I have in the minerals, then
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we are gettin gto a point where he is talking
out of both sides of his mouth.
The Court:

Is that fraud?

Mr. Boyden: I t is fraud, because he is representing to her what his intention is. H e is
expecting her to rely upon it, and she does rely
upon it, and now he brings an equitable action
to try and enforce the lies which he has told
her, and that is fraud with every example that
you can place under the books with all the tests.
This in essence your Honor is our case. * * *"
(R. 185)
With that emphasis on the question of fraud, the
trial court in its Conclusions of Law and Findings of
Fact made no mention whatsoever of any remedial fraud.
Therefore, the intent of the trial court is dear in finding
that defendant failed in her burden to show by clear
and convincing evidence that a fraud had been committed. Nevertheless, because of the trial court's omission to rule directly on the question of fraud, it is important at this point that the issue be briefed.
A. Burden of proof.
The burden is on defendant to prove each and every
element of fraud by dear and convincing evidence. See:
Pace, et al. v. Parrish, et al., 122 Utah 141, 247 P. 2d 273,
(1952); Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp. v. Sohm, et al.
v. Nickles, 15 U. 2d 262, 391 P. 2d 293, (1964); Schow v.
Gmrdtone, 18 U. 2d 135, 417 P. 2d 643, (1966).
B. The elements of fraud.
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The leading Utah case setting forth the various elements of common-law fraud is that of Stuck, et al. v.
Delta Land and Water Co., 63 Utah 495, 227 P. 791,
(1924). There the court stated:
"The principles referred to are more tersely stated in 26 C.J. 1062, cited by appellant,
from which we quote the following: 'It may be
stated generally that the elements of actual
fraud consist of: (1) A representation; (2) Its
falsity; (3) Its materiality; (4) The speaker's
knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its
truth; (5) His intent that it should be acted
upon by the person and in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) The hearer's ignorance
of its falsity; (7) His reliance upon its truth;
(8) His right to rely thereon; (9) His consequent and proximate injury."
See also: Pace, et al. v. Parrish, et al., supra; Oberg v.
Sanders, et al, 111 Utah 507, 184 P. 2d 229, (1947) and
Estate Counseling Service v. Merril, Lynch, Pierce, etc.,
303 F. 2d 527 (C. A. 10, 1962).
A consideration of the elements of fraud in the light
of the evidence adduced in this case will quickly demonstrate how far short defendant has fallen in sustaining
her burden of proof.
Element 1: A representation of a present existing
fact.
To constitute "actionable fraud," the false representation must relate to past or present fact and not be
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merely promissory or the expression of an opinion. See:
Adamson, et ux. v. Brockbank, et al.y 122 Utah 52, 185
P. 2d 264, (1947); Schow v. Guardtone, supa.
Clearly, the only possible misrepresentation Bench
could have made, taking defendant's highly questionable
evidence at its best, was promissory in nature and related to a future event that may or may not occur; to-wit,
the exercising of the option. It is interesting to note
that the notary public was a cousin of defendant (R. 101)
that the lawyer who prepared the document had been
known by defendant for a lifetime (R. 100), that defendant's son and daughter-in-law were present at the reading and signing of the document (R. 103), that all that
needed to be done was to interline a reservation of oil
and gas rights if that was so important, that defendant
was well aware that the document contained no such
reservation (R. 103-104), that no effort was made to
reserve oil and gas rights by defendant until over six
years after the Lease Sales Contract had been signed (R.
106-107), and that at the time of the execution of the
contract there was no oil and gas activity whatsoever in
the Duchesne County (R. 99); and all this in the face
of defendant's burden to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that at the time of signing, plaintiff had an
insidious and evil intent to cheat and defraud defendant
by deliberately omitting the reservation of oil and gas
rights from the contract.
Element 2: Its falsity.
"It is also the majority rule that an in-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28
sured is under a duty to read his application
before signing it, and will be considered bound
by a knowledge of the contents of his signed
application. This is merely an application of
fundamental contract law." Theros v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 17 U2d 205,
407P2d685, (1965).
No contention has ever been made that the contract
itself contains any false statement. As a matter of fact,
as we have pointed out, defendant read the contract before signing same and was fully aware of and alert to the
fact that the contract contained no reservation of oil and
gas rights. (R. 103-104) The only claim of falsity has
to do with a claim that plaintiff subjectively intended
to cheat defendant out of her oil and gas rights at a
time when he was orally assuring her that they were
hers — all this at a time when she was signing a document that did not contain such reservations and at a
time when she was fully aware of this fact. This is simply
not the kind of falsity, even assuming it to exist, that
supports the requirements of proof of the cases we are
citing in this brief.
Element 3: Its materiality.
In order for a misrepresentation to be material, it
must go to "the very essence" of the transaction and be
the "very ground" on which the transaction has taken
place. See Kerr, Fraud and Mistake,, 73; Hart v. Laitz,
72 Colo. 315, 211 P. 391, (1922).
In this connection we point out that plaintiff had
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only lived in the Roosevelt area for a few weeks. (R. 10)
He knew absolutely nothing about oil and gas rights
and had had no experience in matters of this kind. (R.
154) We also call attention of the court to the testimony
of defendant that "no drilling or exploration" whatsoever was going on in the area at the time — "no oil
boom." (R. 99)
Element 4: The speaker's knowledge of its falsity
or ignorance of its truth.
Unless fraudulent intent exists when alleged promises and representations are made, they will not constitute fraud for which action at law for deceit may be
maintained. Papinolzolas, et al. v. Sampson, et a/., 274
P. 857, (1929); Schow v. Guardtone, supra.
Element 5: His intent that it should be acted upon
by the person and in the manner reasonably contemplated.
In this connection again, it is clear from the evidence
that Bench had no knowledge of oil and gas potentials
on the farm. (R. 154) He was a new-comer to the area
and totally unsophisticated in business matters. (R. 10)
A local attorney prepared the Lease Sales Contract. (R.
9) There is no evidence to controvert the inference that
all defendant need to have done, if such was the intent
of the parties, was to ask that the reservation be included
in the document. This she did not do. The notary was
a stranger to Bench and the cousin of Pace. (R. 101)
Under such circumstances, it is clear that defendant has
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failed in her burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that Bench made misrepresentations and intended that she act upon them. Yet, such would have to
to be the case under the requirement of Element 5 if
defendant is to prevail on her claim of fraud.
Element 6: The hearer's ignorance of its falsity.
Here again, the falsity would have to be the subjective intent of Bench to exclude the oil and gas rights
and to have Erma Pace rely upon his oral assurances that
this was an oversight, and that he would protect her, and
her ignorance of his malicious intention to deceive. It
is clear from her own testimony that defendant knew
that the contract contained no oil and gas rights reservation, and thus, that she had full knowledge of all material facts. (R. 104-105, 110)
Element 7: Her reliance upon its truth.
The interesting thing here is that the Lease Sales
Contract was signed on September 8, 1965. (Ex. 2) The
Lease Extension was signed on May 22, 1967. (Ex. 16)
The letter exercising the Option and the cashier's check
were delivered to defendant on January 8, 1971, (Exs.
15 & 18) and not until the new proposed Escrow Agreement of Sams (Ex. 6) was presented in May, 1971, was
any effort made to reform the original agreement and to
exclude oil and gas rights from the purchase. (R. 107)
Yet, defendant had the agreement in her possession all
this time, and all this time was aware, by her own admission, of the fact said document did not reserve these
rights to her. (R. 104)
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Element 8: Her right to rely thereon.
(See Statute of Frauds argument.)
We believe that the most important failure of proof
on the part of defendant has to do with her right of reliance. The facts pertaining to the content of the contract
and its meaning were in her possession. She testified as
follows:
"Q. Well, you knew that there was no
reference to oil and gas reservations in that
document, isn't that right?
A.

Yes.

Q. Yet after the reading of the document and the passing of it around and all of
you observing its contents you affixed your
signature to the document, did you not, Mrs.
Pace?
A.

Yes.

Q. You made no effort to make any pencil or pen interlineation to include a reservation of oil and gas rights, did you?
A.

No.

Q. And you made no suggestions that
the document be retyped or modified in any
way at that time, did you?
A.

I though it was understood—

Q. I said, you made no suggestion of
that kind?
A.

No
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Q.

That was in 1965, September 8th?

A.

Right." (R. 104)

and again:
"Q. You were aware very early in the
proceedings of the failure to have the reservation of oil and gas rights in the document were
you not?
A. I was aware that it should have been
in there before I ever signed it/' (R. 110)
It is also interesting to note that when the Extension
to this Lease Sales Contraot was presented to her on
May 22, 1967 (Ex. 16), she read the document and
signed it without making any request for any changes.
Mrs. Pace testified as follows:
"A. I went with him to the lady's house
that made it up.
Q. I am sorry. I had forgotten. The two
of you went to the lady's house who made it up,
and at that particular time you read it, did you
not?
A.

Yes, I read it.

Q.

You understood its contents, did you ?

A.

I did.

Q. And you placed your signature on
that document?

A. I did.
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Q. And you voluntarily at that time were
willing to grant the extension that is provided
by the content of the document?
A.

Yes.

Q.

You may answer that yes or no.
MR. B O Y D E N :
MR. B L A C K :

A.

Dont' stop her.

I want a yes or no
answer.

I said yes, sir.

Q. (By Mr. Black) There is not a mention in that document of any reservation of oil
and gas rights to you, is that not true?
A.

That is true." (R. 105)

The above testimony further establishes the fact that
defendant was guilty of a form of negligence that under
the cases defeats her defense of fraud. Such neglect simply demonstrates that she had no right of reliance whatsoever on any representations on the part of plaintiff
regarding oil and gas rights.
Once again it is interesting to note that there is no
direct evidence that defendant ever placed any reliance
on the claimed oral representations of plaintiff.
In the case of Migliaccio v. Continental Mining and
Milling Co., 196 F. 2d 398 (C. A. 10, 1952), the Tenth
Circuit Coin* of Appeals states that before one can have
relief from a claimed fraud, he must not only show that
he relied, but that he had a right to rely. That right of
reliance does not exist where he is put on notice.
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"Knowledge which is sufficient to lead a
prudent person to inquire about the matter
when it could have been ascertained conveniently, constitutes notice of whatever the inquiry would have disclosed, and will be regarded as knowledge of the facts." Columbian
Nafl Life Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 116 F.2d 705.
Element 9: His consequent and proximate injury.
It is necessary in any fraud action for the person
daiming the fraud to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he has suffered damages. It cannot
merely be a "fraud in the air." Roosevelt v. Missouri
State Life Insurance Co., 78 F. 2d 752 (C. C. A. 8, 1935).
In the case of Smith v. Belles, 132 U. S. 125, 10 S,
Ct. 39, the Court stated:
"According to this theory, the question is
not what the plaintiff might have gained, but
what he had lost by being deceived into the purchase; the defendant is liable to respond in
such damages as naturally and proximately result from the fraud; he is bound to make good
the loss sustained—such moneys as the plaintiff has paid out, with interest, and any other
outlay legitimately attributable to the defendant's fraudulent conduct—but this liability does not include the expectant fruits of an
unrealized speculation, (emphasis added)
See also: Morris v. U. S., 303 F. 2d 533 (C. C. A. 10,
1962); Rummell v. Bailey, 7 U. 2d 137, 320 P. 2d 653,
(1958); Guaranty Mortgage Co. v. Flint, 66 Utah 128,
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240 P. 175, (1925); Kirmear v. Prows, 81 Utah 135, 16
P. 2d 1094 (1932); Estate Counseling Service, Inc. v.
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, etc., 303 F. 2d 527 (10 C. C. A.
1962); Bryant, et al. v. Vaughn, et al., 33 S. W. 2d 729
(Tex. 1939); Toshnek, et al. v. Hefner, et ux., 282 S. W.
2d 298 (Tex. App. 1955); Bauder v. Johnson, 36 S. W.
2d 1112 (Tex. App. 1931).
We also point out that there is no evidence as to
present value of the oil and gas rights and consequently,
no evidence as to defendant's injury. Defendant has
simply failed to discharge her burden of proof on this
element.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT DEFENDANT SUSTAINED HER
BURDEN OF PROVING MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AND THAT THE
NEGLECT OF DEFENDANT WAS EXCUSABLE.
The trial court in its Conclusions of Law states:
" 1 . Defendant had sustained her burden
of persuasion by clear satisfactory, definite
and convincing evidence that at the time of the
execution of the Lease Option, neither plaintiffs nor defendant intended to create an interest in plaintiffs in the oil, gas and mineral
estate in the subject property and that the fail-
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ure of said Lease Option to contain such a reservation was due to mutual mistake of the
parties.
2. Under the circumstances prevailing at
the time the Lease Option Agreement was executed, said mutual mistake was not the result
of any inexcusable neglect."
It is the contention of plaintiffs that defendant clearly failed to sustain her burden of showing by clear and
convincing evidence that there was a mutual mistake of

feet.
A. Burden of Proof.
As with the defense of fraud, the burden is on the
defendant to prove each and every element of mutual
mistake of fact by clear and convincing evidence. See:
Kirchgestner v. D. & R. G. W. Railroad Co., 118 Utah
41,233 P. 2d 699, (1951).
B. The legal principles applicable.
The necessary elements to establish a mutual mistake
of fact on which a party may obtain relief are set forth
in the annotation appearing at 59 A. L. R. 809. The
annotation states:
"Equitable relief from a mutual mistake is
frequently given by a reformation of the contract. But a contract will not be reformed for
a unilateral mistake. Equitable relief may,
however, be given from a unilateral mistake by
a recission of the contract. Essential conditions
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to such relief are (1) the mistake must be of
so grave a consequence that to enforce the contract as actually made would be unconscionable. (2) the matter as to which the mistake
was made must relate to a material feature of
the contract. (3) generally the mistake must
have occurred nothwithstanding the exercise
of ordinary diligence by the party making the
mistake. (4) it must be possible to give relief
by way of recision without serious prejudice
to the other party except the loss of his bargain.
In other words, it must be possible to put him
in a status quo."
The leading Utah case on mutual mistake of fact m
Naisbitt v. Hodges, 6 U. 2d 116, 307 P. 2d 620, (1957),
where it is stated:
"There are numerous cases in this jurisdiction dealing with reformation of an instrument on the ground of mutual mistake. The
guiding criteria are well established. Mutual
mistake of fact may be defined as error in reducing the concurring intentions of the parties
to writing, (case cited) Evidence necessary to
substantiate mutual mistake of fact must be
clear, definite and convincing, and the parties
seeking reformation should not be guilty of
negligence in the execution of the contract or
deed or laches in making timely application for
its reformation. This principle has consistently
been applied in equity cases throughout the reformation of instrument cases" (cases cited)
(emphasis added)
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See also: Ellison v. Johnson, 18 U. 2d 374, 423 P.
2d 657, (1967).
Again, it is the contention of plaintiffs in this action
that it is completely inconsistent for one to say that there
was a mistake when he himself understood very clearly
the omission from a contract of an element of the Agreement at the time that the Contract was executed by the
parties. At the very least, the elements indicated above
would require that the one claiming a mistake, in fact,
be mistaken. That is not the case here.
It is essential to point out that the mistake be mutual
and as to a material fact, and that the party seeking to
set aside a written instrument as a result of such a mistake clearly establish that he or she is free from neglect
in connection with such a mistake. (The issue of materiality was discussed previously in Rwnt IV.) If there
was a mistake in this case, defendant was grossly negligent in allowing the mistake to be perpetuated by the
written Lease Sales Agreement, and again when the extension agreement was granted. On each of these occasions the defendant read the documents in question, fully
understood their contents, knew that they did not reserve to her any oil, gas or mineral rights, and nevertheless placed her signature upon them. That she was
grossly negligent in letting the years roll by without
reforming the contract becomes obvious when we allude
once again to her testimony.
"Q.

You were aware very early in the proceedings of the failure to have the reser-
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vation of the oil and gas rights in the
document, were you not?
A.

I was aware that it should have been in
there before I ever signed it." (R. 110)

The tenor of the position of the Utah Supreme Court
and the general law in this area of contracts is best cited
in the case of Garff Realty Co. v. Better Buildings, Inc.,
234 P. 2d 842, (1951), wherein 12 Am. Jur., Contracts,
Section 137, pp. 628-629, is cited approvingly as follows:
"Ignorance of the contents of an instrument does not ordinarily affect the liability of
one who signs it. * * * If a man acts negligently and in such a way as to justify others in supposing that the writing is assented to by him,
he will be bound both at law and in equity,
even though he supposes the writing is an instrument of an entirely different character.
The courts appear to be unanimous in holding that a person who, having the capacity and
an opportunity to read a contract, is not misled as to its contents and who sustains no confidential relationship to the other party cannot
avoid the contract on the ground of mistake if
he signs it without reading it at least in the absence of special circumstances excusing his
failure to read it. If the contract is plain and
unequivocal in its terms, he is ordinarily bound
thereby. * * * To permit a party, when sued on
a written contract, to admit that he signed it
but to deny that it expresses the agreement he
made or to allow him to admit that he signed
it but did not read it or know its stipulations
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would absolutely destroy the value of all contracts. The purpose of the rule is to give stability to written agreements and to remove the
temptation and possibility of perjury, which
would be afforded '1 parol evidence were admissible. * * *"
This statement of law becomes all the more forceful
in the case at bar when it is understood that defendant
read and understood the contract and was not deceived
in any way as to the contract's contents. By defendant's
own admission, there was nothing in that contract she
did not understand. (R. 104) Of equal importance is
that a party who signs a contract is to be considered
bound by a knowledge of its contents. Thews v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., supra.
The above statements of law apply to general contract law. But it should not be forgotten in this case
that this is a conveyance of real property which places
the added burden on defendant to comply with the Statute of Frauds. (Discussed in Point III.)
Utah law has long recognized the rule that equity
will not cancel an instrument on the ground of mistake
of law or fraudulent misrepresentation of law. In Ackerman v. Branmwell Investment Co., 80 Utah 52, 12 P. 2d
623, (1932), the court said:
"The general rule is that misrepresentations of law or of the legal effect of contracts
and writings does not constitute remedial
fraud."
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POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT ERUED IN RULING
THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT BARRED
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND
LACHES FROM ASSERTING ANY RIGHTS
TO THE OIL, GAS AND MINERAL RIGHTS.
A. The Statute of Limitations issue was timely
raised.
The Statute of Limitations provisions of 78-12-25
and 72-12-26(3), U. C. A. 1953, as amended; the Statute
of Frauds, 25-5-1 et seq., U. C. A. 1953, as amended, and
the theories of estoppel and laches have been raised in
an equitable, timely manner, giving adequate notice to
counsel for the defendant by means of a letter and Memorandum sent to John Paul Kennedy, counsol for defendant, and filed with the court on the 21st day of June,
1974.
With regard to the Statute of Limitations issue, we
call attention to Rule 7(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. We set forth the rule for the convenience of
the Court.
RULE 7. PLEADINGS ALLOWED; FORM
OF MOTIONS
"(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a counterclaim denominated as such. * * * No other
pleading shall be allowed, except that the court
may order a reply to an answer or a third-party
answer!' (Emphasis added)
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Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure,
§§1182,1184, in discussing Rule 7(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which is identical with Utah Rule
7(a), explains the rule:
"The purpose underlying the rule that a
reply is necessary only if the counterclaim is
designated as such is to avoid problems arising
out of the similarity between certain counterclaims and affirmative defenses as well as to
provide a clear guideline for the pleader to
enable him to determine when he must serve a
reply. Thus, if the answer does not contain a
denominated counterclaim, a reply is not required and in theory not permitted, although
the Court is given extensive discretion by Rule
8(c) to allow a reply by treating a counterclaim that is misdesignated as a defense as
though it were properly designated and to impose any terms it deems appropriate on the
correction of the mistake. The court also may
resolve any confusion caused by misdesignation
by ordering the pleader to clarify his answer
to indicate whether certain allegations are intended as defenses or counterclaims. If a party
labels as a counterclaim matter that actually
constitutes a defense, a reply technically is
improper because there is no counterclaim in
fact, although it is difficult to perceive of any
significant sanction befalling the pleader
should he actually interpose a reply . . ."
§§ H84.
«* * * Thus, the function of a pleading in
federal practice is to inform a party of the na-
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ture of the claims and defenses being asserted
against him and the relief demanded by his adversary. The rules reflect a realization that
the supposed effectiveness of pleadings in narrowing and defining the issues is largely a
myth, this function being more effectively performed by discovery, summary judgment, and
pretrial conferences." §§ 1182.
See also: Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 2A §§7.00 to
7.06.
It is also clear that this is the rule in Utah when it
is plaintiffs rather than defendants who are asserting
the applicable section of the Statute of Limitations. See:
Hansen v. Morris, 2 U. 2d 310, 283 P. 2d 884, 886, (1955),
where the court stated:
"As to the contention that the limitations
statute was not pleaded and hence was waived:
W e concede that statutes of limitations generally must be pleaded. Such principle usually
applies to defendants only. In our instant case
we have the unique situation where such a statute must be pleaded by the plaintiff. Under
Rule 8(c) statutes of limitations must be pleaded and at first blush it would appear that
plaintiff is bound by such rule. However, an
anomaly is presented where, as here, plaintiff
must assert the statute, since the only pleading
available to him would be a reply, a pleading
unauthorized under Rule 7(a) as a matter of
right, except in attacking a counterclaim, and
which can only be filed by order of the court.
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Hence, it is obvious that Rule 8(c), in logic
and good sense cannot hold a plaintiff seeking
to assert a statute to knock out a defense, to
the same strict accountability that it can a defendant seeking to knock out a claim"
See also: Thomas v. Brafetfs Heirs, 6 U. 2d 57, 305 P.
2d 507, (1956).
Based on the above authorities, the issue of the
Statute of Limitations was properly before the Court.
B. The Utah three year Statute of Limitations covering fraud and mutual mistake of fact had lapsed both
on the Lease-Sales Contract of September 8, 1965, and
the Lease Extension executed on May 22, 1967, before
defendant first asserted any claim of fraud or mistake.
Defendant signed the Lease Option Agreement in
1965 (Ex. 2); signed an agreement extending the Option
in 1967 (Ex. 16); and did not raise her defenses of fraud
and mutual mistake until after the filing of this lawsuit
in 1972, These basic facts bring the Statute of Limitations into the fore as a valid and important issue when
taken in the light of a long line of cases stating the law
in Utah. In Horn v. Daniel, 315 F. 2d 471, (C. C. A. 10,
1962), plaintiff brought an action to set aside a deed
covering a grantor's interest in mining claims on the
ground of fraud on the part of the grantee. The court
found for defendant holding that the Statute of Limitations had run in view of the fact that the grantor had
all of the information necessary for the discovery of the
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fraud before him during the entire period of the statute.
The court stated:
"Thus it appears that Horn's present
claim of injury in 1957 found its motive in the
subsequent years, and conduct previously approved finds taint through the consequence
of later values. The evidence supports the trial
court's finding that Horn was sufficiently
apprised of his cause of action prior to October
17, 1957, and was in possession of all facts
which would lead an experienced mining man
to conclude that Daniel had negotiated with
Newmont. The law does not favor one who
withholds a purported interest in a mining enterprise awaiting favorable
results, (case
cited) the time of discovery of the existence of
fraud is a question of fact, (case cited) and the
possession of all information necessary to discover fraud satisfied the requirements of the
Utah Statute, (cases cited)
See also: Auerbach v. Samuels, 10 U. 2d 159, 349
P. 2d 1112, (1960); Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake Investment Co., 43 Utah 181,194,134 P. 603, (1913); Weight
v. BaUey, 45 Utah 584, 147 P. 899, (1915); Reese Howell
Co. v. Brown, 48 Utah 142, 158 P. 684, (1916); Gibson v.
Jensen, 48 Utah 244, 158 P. 426, (1916); Smith v. Edwards, 81 Utah 244, 17 P. 2d 264, (1932).
The Horn decision, supra, was made in light of the
three year Utah Statute of Limitations governing fraud
which states in part:
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" . . . the cause of action in such case shall
not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake." U.C.A. 1953, as
amended, Sec. 78-12-26(3).
The law in Utah on this point is best summarized
in the case of Taylor v. Moore, et al., 87 Utah 493, 51
P. 2d 222, (1935), as cited in Migliaccio v. Continental
Mining and Milling Co., supra, where it is stated:
"And, Utah courts have said that 'A party
who has opportunity of knowing the facts constituting the alleged fraud cannot be inactive
and afterwards allege a want of knowledge that
arose by reason of his own laches and negligence.' "
See also: Larsen v. Utah Loan and Trust Company,
23 Utah 449, 65 P. 208, 17A, C. J. S., Sec. 448, Page 560;
37 Am. Jur. 2d 555.
Other cases have referred to that "opportunity of
knowing" as notice. The case of Columbian National
Life Insurance Co. v. Rogers, supra, is worth requoting
on that issue. The court there said:
"Knowledge which is sufficient to lead a
prudent person to inquire about the matter
when it could have been ascertained conveniently, constitutes notice of whatever the inquiry would have disclosed, and will be regarded as knowledge of the facts."
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The case at bar is of greater impact. The defendant
was beyond the point of inquiry because she "knew"
there was no reservation whatsoever contained in the
contract.
McConkie v. Hartman, 529 P. 2d 801, (1974), is the
most recent holding of the Supreme Court of Utah concerning the issue of the Statute of Limitations. The facts
of that case are strikingly similar to those before the
court in the instant matter. In that case the original
purchasers from the defendant assigned their interest
under a purchase contract to the plaintiffs. In the original
purchase contract between the defendant and the purchasers, the defendant reserved the mineral rights to
himself and his wife. Such reservation was recorded on
Warranty Deeds that were deposited with an escrow.
In November of 1960, plaintiffs and the defendants entered into a real estate contract which corrected and
amended some of the conditions of the real estate contract between the defendants and the original purchasers.
This contract contained no reservation of mineral rights.
In December of 1960, the defendants had their attorney
prepare two Warranty Deeds to replace the original
Warranty Deed, and these new deeds contained the reservation of the mineral interests. In 1964, plaintiffs
negotiated for a loan with Travelers Insurance Company.
At the same time they paid to the escrow the balance due
on the contract and directed the escrow holder to deliver
the Warranty Deeds to Security Title Company for title
insurance. The court below was affirmed in its determ-
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ination that the Statute of Limitations had run against
the plaintiffs in the following language:
"The court below found that the plaintiffs
had full opportunity to discover the reservations in the deeds when the deeds were delivered to Security Title Company and when
they reviewed problems in the chain of title.
That all of the circumstances existing at or
about the time the deeds were recorded were
such as to furnish full opportunity to the plaintiffs for the discovery of the mistake or fraud,
if any existed. The court further found that
more than eight years had elapsed since the
time for reasonable inquiry on the part of the
plaintiffs would have revealed the mistake or
fraud to the time of filing their complaint. The
trial court concluded that the claims of the
plaintiffs are barred by the Statutes of Limitations above referred to."
The case at bar, one more time, is stronger in its
facts than is McCoknie v. Hartman, supra. The defendant admits knowledge of the lack of reservation of the
oil, gas and mineral rights in the contract.
Also, restatements of a fraudulent misrepresentation
or a mutual mistake by one who originally made it, after
the party has been put on a duty of inquiry, do not of
themselves constitute concealment excusing delay in
bringing an action for the damages thereby occasioned.
See: Feak v. Marion Steam Shovel Company, 84 F. 2d
670 (C. A. 9, 1936); 70 A. L. R. 942 (Examination of
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real property before entering into a contract precludes
recission on grounds of falsity of representations); 107
A. L. R. 589.
POINT VII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE PLAINTIFF ACQUIESCED IN
ACCEPTING THE RETURN OF THE MONEY OFFERED AS TENDER IN COMPLETION OF THE LEASE-SALES CONTRACT.
The Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim
states:
"Even if plaintiff properly exercised a
valid option, he later acquiesced to its rejection
by the defendant."
In factual support of the foregoing proposition, counsel cited Exhibit 10, a letter from Reid Bench to Emia
Pace, dated June 15, 1971. Plaintiff contends that proposition should be rejected for several reasons.
To begin, the language of the Lease-Sales Contract
makes it clear the writing was complete and unambiguous
on its face. (Ex. 2) The contract contained an easy to
understand option to purchase which could be exercised
by simply making a $2,000.00 down payment. When the
time came for the exercise of the option, the down payment was made and accepted without question or reservation. (R. 106) Although the defendant claimed that
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there was a discussion at the time of tender concerning
a future contract for the sale of the property (R. 89),
nothing was put in writing and no additional consideration was exchanged. Therefore, no valid alteration was
made to the clear and unambiguous terms of the original
Lease-Sales Contract. At that point, all that was required to purchase the land had taken places, but for
continued payments as per the original Lease-Sales Contract. Several months later the defendant attempted to
append conditions to the option not contained in the
original contract including the requirement of an escrow
(Ex. 6) and the reservation of mineral rights.
Next, the letter of Mr. Beaslin, dated April 5, 1971,
with all due respect, is at the least forceful in nature.
It reads in part as follows:
"Also, pursuant to the Escrow Agreement,
which Mr. Sam prepared, and which you have
a copy of, would have to be executed, or, you
will merely continue on with the lease until the
same expires by its terms, which would be September 15, of 1973."
The letter goes on to state:
"If you want to exercise the option to purchase >•
the property, then it will be necessary that
you either sign the Escrow Agreement and
place the same at the bank, together with a deed
from Mrs. Pace to be delivered upon the payment of the contract amount in full, or, it will
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be construed that you have not in fact bought
the property."
The proposed escrow agreement, contrary to the
terms of the contract, contained a reservation of oil and
gas rights. Mr. Bench, without benefit of legal counsel,
responded to the Beaslin letter and stated:
" I agreed to lease the property with an option
to purchase and the terms of said purchase
were agreed upon by both Owners and Lessee.
I have not signed the papers prepared by Mr.
Sam because these terms are being changed."
(See Exhibit 8.)
Defendant has claimed the original lease-option
agreement in this case contains numerous ambiguities,
including the nature of title and extent of interest. This
condusory daim is unsupportable by specifics or case
law to show that any ambiguity in fact exists in said
document. As we pointed out in oral argument there are
no ambiguities in the contract. There was no need of an
escrow. Payments following the exercise of the option
could have been made directly to the seller just as they
were before the exercise of the option. It is true that an
escrow holder could have received a deed from Mrs. Pace
to await final payment but it would have been just as
easy for her to make out a deed and hold it herself to
await the final payment.
The settlement negotiations which resulted are listed
below and serve to underscore the fact that the plaintiff
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in no way acquiesced in the rejection of his tender under
the sales option. It will be recalled that the $2,000.00
had been returned by Mrs, Pace on June 2, 1971, and the
option exercise repudiated.
First, the plaintiff's letter of June 15, 1971, (Ex. 10)
contains the following language:
" I t is only our desire and intention to purchase the farm as per our original lease purchase agreement and the terms there outlined.
Let's get together and iron out the difference."
This language cannot be interpreted as an acquiescence in the repudiation of the option. Rather, that
language clearly shows the plaintiff was never willing to
accept the refunded money and abandon his rights under
the contract.
Second, plaintiff, after writing the aforementioned
letter, continued to attempt, as best he could, to compromise the difficulty he had come to realize existed
between the parties to the contract. (R. 129) Though
these attempts failed, they certainly served as notice
to Mrs. Pace that the plaintiff, again, did not acquiesce
in the rejection.
Third, with the realization that his attempts to compromise had failed, Mr. Bench filed this action on November 30, 1972. This filing came at a point in time
sufficiently close to the June 15, 1971, letter and the
subsequent failure to compromise so as to give notice
to Mrs. Pace that the plaintiff did not acquiesce in the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

53
repudiation of his attempted exercise of the option. It
is well established that specific performance is an equitable remedy. It is also well established that equity aids
the vigilant and refuses to help those who sleep on their
rights to the prejudice of the party against whom relief
is sought. 71 Am. Jur. 2d 126-127.
As is apparent from the factual sequence of events
stressed herein, plaintiff was not guilty of acquiescence
in the defendant's rejection nor is he guilty of unreasonable delay, which might prejudice the defendant, in the
commencement of this action. The plaintiff acted at
all times in such a manner as to give notice that he
rightfully expected his option and tender to be honored
according to the written agreement between the parties.
We also point out to the Court that at the time the
lawsuit was filed, plaintiff was still within the time for
exercising his option. The case was filed on November
30, 1972, and the option period would not expire until
September 15, 1973. In the Complaint, plaintiffs ask for
specific performance of the contract including the right
to exercise his option. Certainly, it was apparent by this
time that the formal handing of $2,000.00 once again to
the defendant would have been to no avail, and the law
has never required the performance of a useless act.
We cite Williston on Contracts, 3rd ed. Vol. 15, p. 447,
as follows:
"Section 1819 . . . W A I V E R O F OBJ E C T I O N TO T E N D E R . Under general
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principles previously discussed, tender is excused by obstruction or prevention or imposition of unwarranted conditions by the person
to whom it is to be made. So where the obligee
has manifested to the obligor that tender, if
made, will not be accepted, the obligor is excused from making tender as it would be at
most merely a futile gesture."
Counsel calls attention to a document he calls "An
oil lease disclaimer . . . " That is not the title of the document. The title of the document is "Proof of Possession."
(Ex. 12) The Court should note that such document was
placed before plaintiff for signature long after the rights
and obligations of the parties had become fixed. He
agreed to sign the document only after attorney Mangan
had assured ham that his rights, pursuant to the original
contract, including his oil and gas rights, would not in
any way be jeopardized. (R. 136, 141)
POINT VIII.
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO PRODUCE
HER SON AARON AT TRIAL IS A MATERIAL FAILURE IN HER OVERALL BURDEN
OF PROOF.
At this point it is interesting to note that the defendant held the property as a tenant in common with
Aaron Pace, her son. The signatures of both appear on
the Lease-Sales Contract. At no time was Aaron Pace
called to testify, however, concerning the original signing
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of the Lease-Sales Contract here in question. Since Mr.
Pace was a party to the events at issue, one must conclude that he was not misled or mistaken concerning the
Lease-Sales Contract and its contents. If Mr. Pace was
was not a party to the same misunderstandings as the
defendant, one must conclude defendant has not me£
her evidentiary burden of establishing fraud or mistake
by "clear and convincing,, evidence. (See Points IV and
V on Fraud and Mistake.) If one cotenant is misled or
mistaken, while another is not, the evidence does not
reach the point of being "clear and ronvineing." This
is especially true where Aaron was in a confidential relationship with defendant.
CONCLUSION
The turning point of this case centers around one
question to and answer of defendant on cross-examination.
"Q. You were aware very early in the
proceedings of the failure to have the reservation of oil and gas rights in the document, were
you not?
A. I was aware that it should have been
in there before I ever signed it."
On the fraud issue of right of reliance, if defendant
was aware of the omission of the oil and gas rights reservation in the contract and also of the further fact that
"it should have been in there," she had no right to rely
on any misrepresentations made by plaintiff, even assuming such to exist. On the mutual mistake of fact issue,
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said testimony condusively demonstrates that defendant
was not mistaken either as to the absence of a reservation of oil and gas rights in the contract or of the importance of its omission in said document, because she
admitted voluntarily and not as a result of a leading
question that, "I was aware that it should have been in
there . . ."
The case law we have cited in this brief
places the legal burden on a party claiming a mutual
mistake of fact of comporting himself in a non-negligent
manner. Defendant was plainly and simply guilty of
negligence in not taking timely steps to reform the instrument, knowing that the reservation of oil and gas
rights, "should have been in there."
On the Statute of Limitations and Laches issue, the
three year period began to run when defendant either
knew or should have known that the contract did not
reserve the oil and gas rights which she now claims. Her
unequivocal admission that she knew the reservation of
said rights was not set forth in the contract and furthermore that said reservation "should have been in there"
before she ever signed the contract, started the Statute
running and precludes the defenses of fraud and mistake.
As has been explained on the issue of tender, after
defendant's acceptance of plaintiffs' tender, the respective rights, duties and obligations of the parties were
fixed by the terms of the Lease Sales Contract. Any
negotiations subsequent thereto were simply attempts
to settle a disputed claim. Defendant's repudiation of
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the tender was unequivocal leaving no doubt of her intent not to honor the terms of the Lease Sales Contract. Therefore, plaintiffs were left with no alternative
to commencing this action.
On the basis of the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted to the Court that the judgment of the court
below should be reversed and plaintiffs should be granted
the specific performance prayed for in their Complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
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